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INTRODUCTION

The public education system in the United States fails to educate
economically disadvantaged children. Students from poor families are
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more likely to repeat grades,' to have below average basic academic
skills, 2 to drop out of school,3 and to forego attending college. 4 These
gaps in educational achievement translate into an inability to compete
effectively in the employment market place.5 In an attempt to remedy
these inequalities, plaintiffs have attacked the most obvious source of
disparity: state school financing schemes.6
1. The likelihood of repeating a grade corresponds directly to the number of years a child has
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A VISION OF AmERICA'S FUTURE, 70 (1989) [hereinafter CDF] (containing a table demonstrating the correlation between repeating a grade and the
number of years in poverty for 16-year-olds in the United States) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMNT (1986)). With 1-2 years in poverty, 20% have
repeated one or more grades; with 3-7 years in poverty, 27.7% have repeated one or more grades;
with 8 or more years in poverty, 42.2% have repeated one or more grades. Id.
2. CDF, supra note 1, at 69. See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S.

lived in poverty. See

DEP'T OF EDUCATION,

1989

EDUCATION INDICATORS,

124, 150 (showing the failure of students from

disadvantaged urban homes to achieve an average proficiency in reading, history, and literature);
Julius Menacker, Poverty as a Suspect Class in Public Education Equal Protection Suits, 54
WEST EDUC. L. REP. 1085, 4-6 (1989) (showing that data from school districts in and around Chicago demonstrates a clear connection between the percentage of low-income students and substandard results on the American College Test).
3. CDF, supra note 1, at 70 (stating that children from poor homes are almost three times
more likely to drop out of school than those from nonpoor homes); see also id. at 71 (showing chart
entitled "Dropout Rates: High School Dropout Rates for 18- to 21-Year-Old Youths by Race and
Poverty, 1987" compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data from CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY).

4. CDF, supra note 1, at 70-71 (showing the widening gap between poor and nonpoor students who attend college). In 1975 about one-third of both poor and nonpoor 18- to 21-year-olds
had completed one or more years of college. By 1986 the number of poor 18- to 21-year-olds completing one or more years of college had dropped 4%, while the number of their nonpoor counterparts had increased 5%. Id.
5. CDF, supra note 1, at 71 (showing that median income, adjusted for inflation, of young
family heads-under 30-years-old-who dropped out of high school declined from 1973 to 1986 by
53%, while median income of young family heads who graduated from high school dropped 31%,
and median income of young family heads who graduated from college dropped only 3%).
6. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1); Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn.
1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635
(Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983);
Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Board-of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y.
1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357
S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair School Fin. Council,
Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811
P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364
S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va.
1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). Because of the nature of financ-
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Plaintiffs and courts have resorted to an examination of financing
schemes in terms of per-pupil expenditure because expenditure is the
easiest counter-equalizing factor to identify.' Not all courts, however,
have accepted the correlation between dollars expended and academic
achievement.8 Both the Colorado Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have refused to recognize any relationship between school
financing and educational quality.9 Those courts found the evidence of
such a correlation inconclusive because of the ongoing controversy
among educators and commentators over the relationship between expenditure and academic achievement. 10
Recently, however, the controversy appears to have subsided and
few educators or commentators argue that educational expenditure is
not at least a factor in academic achievement. 1 The case law reflects
this change. Most recent cases sustaining challenges to school financing
schemes recognize the correlation between spending and achievement
and address it in determining whether states are maintaining a sufficient level of educational opportunity. s Furthermore, those jurisdictions that have rejected such challenges no longer rely on a lack of a
demonstrated nexus between funding and educational quality to justify
ing scheme litigation in many jurisdictions, a series of determinative cases have reached the highest state courts. The list above includes the first case of each such series. The list is limited to state
court decisions because federal remedies have been virtually foreclosed by the decision in San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
7. The New Jersey Supreme Court was very candid about its examination of the state financing scheme in terms of revenue disparities in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The court stated that it "deal[t] with the problem in those terms
because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we have been shown no other viable criterion
for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate." Id. at 295.
8. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43 (questioning the correlation between cost and quality
in deciding a federal equal protection challenge to a state financing scheme); Lujan, 649 P.2d at
1018 (refusing to accept a correlation between school financing and educational quality and opportunity); Thompson, 537 P.2d at 641-42 (declining to enter into the controversy over the relationship of per-pupil expenditure and the quality of education).
9. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018; Thompson, 537 P.2d at 641-42.
10. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018; Thompson, 537 P.2d at 642.
11. See, e.g., NEIL G. Amos & LAMAR MOODY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DISTRICT SIZE
AND COsT FACTORS TO ACHIEEMENT OF FOURTH AND EIGHTH GRADE STUDENTS, BUREAU OF EDUCATIoN RESEARCH, MIssissIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY 11-12 (1981). This study of 152 school districts in a
southeastern state found a direct correlation between total regular classroom expenditure per pupil
and vocabulary, reading comprehension, and mathematics scores at the fourth- and eighth-grade
levels. Id. See also Menacker, supra note 2, at 4 (citing findings reported in ALLAN C. ORNSTEIN &
DANIEL U. LEVINE, FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION 409 (4th ed. 1988) of the "powerful effect of community income characteristics in determining school achievement").
12. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989) (stating
that "[t]he amount of money spent on a student's education has a real and meaningful impact on
the educational opportunity offered that student"); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v.
State, 769 P.2d 684, 687 (Mont. 1989) (accepting the finding of the trial court that "[t]here is a
positive correlation between the level of school funding and the level of educational opportunity").
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their decisions.1 3 This acceptance of the effect of per-pupil expenditures
on educational achievement has shifted the focus of courts confronting
school financing challenges to an examination of what level of educational opportunity and equality is required by their state constitutions.
The financing schemes that have been the basis for this reform litigation all have in common the dual nature of their funding. 14 Essentially, all challenges to these schemes are attacks on the reliance upon
local funding supplemented by state monies. Varying property values
among the individual districts within a state create wide disparities,
both in the funding available to a district and in the tax burden on
district residents. 5 Plaintiffs attack these disparities in the finance reform cases."6
The 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez' 7 essentially foreclosed any
federal Constitutional remedy for these inequalities.'" As a result, plain13. In fact, although it rejected a challenge to the Georgia school financing scheme, the Georgia Supreme Court found specifically that "there is a direct relationship between a district's level
of funding and the educational opportunities which a school district is able to provide its children." McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160 (Ga. 1981). In addition, the New York Court of
Appeals assumed the existence of a "significant correlation between amounts of money expended
and the quality and quantity of educational opportunity provided" when it rejected a challenge to
New York's financing scheme in Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363 & n.3 (1982),
appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
14. Every state except Hawaii relies on a system of funding consisting of both local and state
contributions. Hawaii collects all local and state funds and then distributes them equally between
the two at-large districts. See William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of
State ConstitutionalProvisions in Public School FinanceReform Litigation,75 VA. L. REv. 1639,
1640 n.6, 1647 & n.33 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989)
(Edgewood 1) (demonstrating that "[t]he 100 poorest districts had an average tax rate of 74.5 cents
and spent an average of $2,978 per student" while "[tlhe 100 wealthiest districts had an average
tax rate of 47 cents and spent an average of $7,233 per student"). In Edgewood I the Texas Supreme Court pointed out that the disparities in funding do not result from a lack of tax effort, but
rather from inadequate tax bases.
Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity
to free themselves. Because of their inadequate tax base, they must tax at significantly higher
rates in order to meet the minimum requirements for accreditation; yet their educational programs are typically inferior. The location of new industry and development is strongly influenced by tax rates and the quality of local schools. Thus the property-poor districts with their
higher tax rates and inferior schools are unable to attract new industry or development and so
have little opportunity to improve their tax base.
Id.
16. Different states have enacted different types of financing schemes in an attempt to alleviate some of the inequalities. See Annette B. Johnson, State Court Interventionin School Finance
Reform, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 325, 328-31 (1979); Note, supra note 14, at 1648 & n.36. As the vast
number of cases still being filed demonstrate, these schemes have thus far met with little success.
See, e.g., Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
17. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
18. Id. (holding that strict scrutiny was not applicable to the Texas financing scheme because
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tiffs have been forced to seek redress under state constitutional provisions. Plaintiffs have based school finance challenges on state equal
protection clauses, 19 state education clauses, 20 or both.2 1 This Note ex-

amines selected finance reform cases and outlines some of the factors
that have led to differing results in various jurisdictions. Part II considers the methodologies of state courts and notes that at face value the
courts' decisions suggest that the success or failure of finance challenges
turns on distinctions between the states' constitutions. Part III of this
Note argues that the state courts' inconsistent application of the constitutional provisions demonstrates that the outcomes of these cases
rarely, if ever, turn upon the characteristics of the state constitutions.
Part IV suggests that there are many factors that can contribute to, and
in some cases determine, the outcome of this type of litigation. The
Note concludes by identifying one characteristic that all successful finance scheme litigation has in common: a frustration with legislative
inaction.

wealth is not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right). The Texas financing
scheme did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
system bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Id. at 55. Because of this essential
foreclosure of federal remedies, this Note will not examine the federal equal protection claims that
have been raised in some cases.
19. Examples of cases decided under an equal protection rationale include: DuPree v. Alma
Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano
II), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Milliken v.
Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Washakie County
Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
20. Examples of cases decided under state education clauses include: Blase v. State, 302
N.E.2d 46 (IMI.1973); Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Britt v. North Carolina State
Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987);
Coalition For Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Danson v. Casey, 399
A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
21. Examples of cases decided under both equal protection and education clause rationales
include: Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649
P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking,
537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983);
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair School Fin. Council, Inc.
v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES OF THE STATE COURTS

Minimally Adequate Education: Jurisdictions That Have
Upheld Their State's Financing Scheme
1.

Equality Claims

The equal protection provisions of state constitutions 22 promise
fairness of treatment to all people in the exercise of fundamental rights
23
and eliminate suspect classification based on impermissible criteria. If
a state's action has an impact on a fundamental right or a suspect classification, the usual presumption of validity disappears and the act will
be judged under a more exacting standard.2 4 Under this "strict scrutiny" test the state must demonstrate that its action is necessarily related to a compelling governmental interest.2 ' By contrast, if a court
finds that the state's act does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class, then the state must show only a rational relation to a legitimate purpose.2 6
a. Suspect Classification
When rejecting equal protection challenges, state courts have been
uniform in their approach to suspect classification claims. 27 The Colorado Supreme Court examined such a claim in Lujan v. Colorado State
Board of Education.25 The court was faced with two different claims
22. Some state constitutions do have an explicit state equal protection clause. See, e.g., Wyo.
CONsT. art. I, § 34 (providing that "[a]U Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform application"); IDAHO CONsT. art. 1, § 2 ("Government is instituted for [the people's] equal protection").
Most state constitutions have other provisions that the state courts have interpreted as having the
same effect. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo. 1982)
(stating that Colorado's due process clause, COLO. CONST. art. H, § 25, encompasses equal protection guarantees); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 142-43 (Or. 1976) (stating that Oregon's privileges
and immunities clause, OR. CONST. art. I, § 20, encompasses the same protections as the federal
equal protection clause).
23. E.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1014-15; Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 818 (Ohio
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
24. E.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1015.
25. In addition to the compelling interest element, the Lujan court also required the state to
show, where appropriate, that the action is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Id. at 1016.
Accord Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo.) (requiring a
least restrictive means prong in the analysis), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
26. E.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1016.
27. Many jurisdictions have not even discussed a suspect class analysis. See, e.g., Fair Sch.
Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981). Several other jurisdictions have dismissed such claims summarily by asserting that the
United States Supreme Court decided that the taxable wealth of a school district is not, by itself, a
suspect class in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 787 (Md. 1983); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568,
579 (Wis. 1989).
28. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
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asserting the existence of a "suspect class." The plaintiffs urged the
court to recognize either a class composed of low-wealth school districts
or a class composed of low-income people.2 9
The court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the lowwealth school districts composed a suspect class. The court found that
Colorado's equal protection clause applied only to individuals because
by its very terms it embodies personal rights.3 0 This restrictive definition meant that a political body such as a school district could not be a
suspect class. 1 The court also found that poor persons were insufficiently distinct and insular as a class to satisfy the requirements of
equal protection analysis.2 The court found that this putative class had
no relevant common attributes or characteristics.3 The plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that the group was centered in low-property wealth districts, that poor people received a consistently lower level of education,
or that the districts in which poor people lived spent less money on
34
education.
The court also found that even if the plaintiffs had demonstrated
any of these correlations, their suspect class argument would fail because the group lacked the traditional features associated with suspectness.3 The court concluded that as a group, poor people have no
readily identifiable racial or lineal traits; they are instead an amorphous
group that varies by time and place. 6 The poor have not been historically subject to purposeful unequal treatment,3 7 and have not been reduced to complete political powerlessness.3 8 The court, therefore,
determined that the low-income group failed to qualify as a suspect
class.3 9
b.

Fundamental Right

The issue of whether educational opportunity is a fundamental
right under state constitutional provisions has presented the courts
29.

Id. at 1020.

30. Id.
31. Id. The New York Court of Appeals also rejected a claim of a suspect class based upon
"units of local government." Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
32. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1020.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1020-21.
35. Id. at 1021. But see Menacker, supra note 2 (arguing that wealth should be a suspect

classification characteristic in education cases).
36.

Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1021.

37. Id. The court pointed out that Colorado had made a concerted effort to lessen the impact
upon the poor through its school financing scheme. Id.
38.
39.

Id. at 1022.
Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:129

with a much more difficult question than the suspect class analysis.
Courts generally deem a right fundamental if it has "been recognized as
having a value essential to individual liberty in our society. ' 40 In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez4 ' the Supreme
Court attempted to establish a more specific means of identifying fundamental rights. The Court found that rights are fundamental for equal
protection purposes only if they are guaranteed "explicitly or implicitly" by the Constitution.42 The vast majority of state courts, however,
have refused to apply the Rodriguez test, basing their refusal primarily
on the inherently different nature of the federal and state constitutions.
State courts have been quick to point out that the federal Constitution is one of delegated powers and specified authority. 4 The Tenth
Amendment states that all powers that are not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution and that the Constitution does not deny to
the states belong to the states or to the people. 44 Consequently, the expressed or implicit inclusion of a right in the Federal Constitution has
great significance.4 5
State constitutions, on the other hand, do not restrict governmental authority to the boundaries of their text. 46 The states are not constrained by the explicit or implicit contents of their constitutions.
Accordingly, the fact that a state constitution includes a particular provision does not necessarily reflect any fundamental importance attached
to the activity itself.47 This crucial difference between the nature of the
Federal Constitution and its state counterparts has led virtually all
40. Id. at 1015 n.7. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (finding
that a right of privacy protects contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the
right to privacy encompasses abortion); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (addressing the
right to vote and the right to interstate travel); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621 (1969) (involving the right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (addressing the right to procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (acknowledging the right of a parent to direct upbringing and education of children).
41. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
42. Id. at 33-34. In order for a right to be fundamental, this test requires that it be based on
or derived from a specific constitutional provision. Id. See also id. at 34 nn.73-76.
43. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 n.5 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459
U.S. 1139 (1983). Accord Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1017; Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458
A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 1987) (quoting Nyquist).
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
45. E.g., Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366 n.5.
46. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1017.
47. See, e.g., id. (citing provisions in the Colorado State Constitution discussing mining and
irrigation, COLO. CONST. art. XVI, and nuclear detonations, COLO. CONsT. art. XXVI). See also
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366 n.5 (citing provisions in the state constitution discussing superintendence and repair of canals, N.Y. CONsT. art. XV, § 3); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813,
818 (Ohio 1979) (pointing to a provision in the state constitution discussing worker's compensation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
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state courts to reject the Rodriguez test.48
The natural assumption after the rejection of the Rodriguez test
was that the courts would turn to a more general means of determining
the importance of a right to individual liberty. 49 At first glance this is
exactly what most courts have appeared to do. The Supreme Court of
Colorado noted the economic and social role of education in a child's
development and the effect of education on the level of future involvement in political and community life.5 0 The New York Court of Appeals
recognized that education is of primary importance to the State.5 1 The
expected declaration, however, that a right with such great consequences to individual liberty should be considered a fundamental right
for equal protection analysis was not forthcoming. The courts instead
used an ad hoc balancing test to determine what level of scrutiny
should be applied, foregoing the fundamental rights analysis.
State courts have enumerated several factors that make the strict
scrutiny standard inappropriate in school finance cases. The courts
have emphasized the lack of expertise of the judicial branch in dealing
with finance reform.52 This lack of institutional competence manifests
itself in two ways. First, the courts seek to avoid excessive involvement
in questions of taxation. The Georgia Supreme Court was particularly
worried about its lack of familiarity with local problems which undergird decisions involving public revenues.5 3 Second, the courts are reluc48. In Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1977) (SerranoII), the California Supreme
Court specifically stated that its finding of a fundamental right "should in no way be interpreted
to imply an acceptance of the [Rodriguez test]." The court went on to say that it was "constrained
no more by inclination than by authority to gauge the importance of rights and interests. . . by
the terms of our compendious, comprehensive, and distinctly mutable state Constitution." Id. In a
footnote, the court discussed the ease and number of times the California Constitution has been
amended. Id. n.47. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1656-57 (noting the political nature and ease
with which state constitutions can be changed).
The New Jersey Supreme Court went so far as to argue that the Rodriguez test is inappropriate even for federal equal protection analysis by pointing out that "the right to acquire and hold
property is guaranteed in the Federal and State Constitutions, and surely that right is not a likely
candidate for [strict scrutiny]." Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973). Accord Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ohio 1979) (quoting Robinson
with approval), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
But see Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v.
Herachler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (both cases relying implicitly on
a Rodriguez-type fundamentality test).
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50. Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982). See also
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ. 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983) (recognizing the vital
role education plays in society and quoting Lujan with approval).
51. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S.
1139 (1983).
52. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at
786; Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 819; Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018.
53. McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 167 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41, with approval). See also
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tant to interfere in the area of educational planning. The lack of any
authoritative consensus on how to provide the greatest educational opportunity for all students leads courts to conclude that the legislature is
54
best equipped to choose between the many approaches.
Courts also are concerned by the difficulty of distinguishing the
right to an education from any of the other rights or interests enumerated in their state constitutions. The Maryland Court of Appeals was
quick to point out that the right to an adequate education is "no more
fundamental" than the right to personal security, fire protection, welfare subsidies, health care, or any other governmental service.55 This
difficulty in distinguishing between education and other governmental
services, when combined with the courts' concern over lack of expertise
in the area of taxation and education policy, convinces many courts
that the strict scrutiny standard is inappropriate in school finance
56
cases.
Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 786 (noting the courts' "lack of expertise and familiarity with local
problems implicated in the raising and disposition of public revenues," and citing Rodriguez with
approval); Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 819 (noting the "difficult questions of local and statewide taxation"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
54. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018 (stating that this is basically a question of "what is the best
public policy" and should be left to the legislature); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 167 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42, which stated that this "involves the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy"); Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 819 (noting that finance reform involves educational
policy choices and finding strict scrutiny inappropriate).
55. Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 786. The Georgia Supreme Court enlisted the help of New Jersey's
highest court to make the same point when it quoted from Robinson v. Cahill:
This is not to say that public education is not vital. Of course it is. Rather we stress how
difficult it would be to find an objective basis to say the equal protection clause selects education and demands inflexible statewide uniformity in expenditure. Surely no need is more basic
than food and lodging ... Essential also are police and fire protection, as to which the sums
spent per resident vary with local decision. Nor are water and sundry public health services
available (on an equalized basis).
McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 166-67 (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 284 (N.J.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (N.J. 1973). See Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 644-45 (Idaho 1975) (holding
that a rational basis analysis was required because of inherent problems with the strict scrutiny
test and because of the fact that the court had applied rational basis to equal protection claims
involving liquor licensing statutes and motor vehicle negligence claims). But see infra part fl.B.1.
56. The New York Court of Appeals found that strict scrutiny was only to be applied when
faced with the "intentional discrimination against a class of persons grouped together by reason of
personal characteristics." Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. Since the court rejected the suspect classification claim, it applied a rational basis standard. Id.
Two courts did find education to be a fundamental right. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989), and the Arizona Supreme Court in Shofstall v.
Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973), both held that although education was a fundamental right, the
application of that right was limited to the scope of the relevant educational provision. Kukor, 436
N.W.2d at 579-80 (stating that the state education provision does not call for equality in per-pupil
expenditure); Shofstall, 515 P.2d at 592 (setting out specific standards required by the education
provisions). When the courts determined that the state was fulfilling the constitutional mandate of
the education provision, they found that an equal protection claim was entitled only to a rational
basis standard. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 580; Shofstall, 515 P.2d at 592-93.
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c. Rational Basis
Those courts that have found a strict scrutiny standard to be improper for finance scheme cases instead apply a traditional rational basis test. Under this standard, a court must determine whether the
challenged scheme rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.5 7 The
state interest at stake in the finance cases is the preservation of local
control over education.
The dual nature of the finance schemes gives the local taxpayers
control over the education system through their power to establish the
school budget .5 s The taxpayers determine how much money will be
raised and influence how it should be spent.59 The courts have used
various tools of statutory interpretation to ascertain the validity of the
local control rationale. The history of educational funding within the
state,60 certain provisions of the state constitutions interpreted in light
of the concerns of their framers and contemporaneous statutes,6 ' and
the observations of educational commentators"2 have all been enlisted
as support for the importance of local control of the schools. Courts
have also determined that local control fosters "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence." 6 3 In vir-

tually every case, the state goal of local control has been sufficient6 4 to
satisfy the rational basis test.
57. E.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1022; Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 788.
58. E.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 367.
59. E.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 367. In Nyquist the New York
court found "a direct correlation between the system of local school financing and implementation
of the desires of the taxpayer." Id.
60. See Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (Ohio 1979) (finding that "[t]he history of educational funding in Ohio... has been an accommodation between two competing interests-the interest in local control of educational programs and the means to fund them and the
interest of the state in insuring that all children receive an adequate education"); Hornbeck, 458
A.2d at 788 (stating that "Maryland's public school system has been financed by a combination of
local tax revenues and State contributions virtually throughout its entire history").
61. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 580-81 (Wis. 1989) (concluding that "[t]he principle of local control in Wisconsin ... is not merely a theoretical notion, but rather is a constitutionally based and protected precept as to which the framers of our constitution were firmly
committed").
62.

See Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 820 (quoting GEORGE D. STRAYER &
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M. HAIG, THE

(1923) (discussing the competing interests of

equal educational opportunity and local control)).
63. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 822 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 50 (1973)).
64. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, found that local control was not sufficiently important for the purpose of the rational basis test. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90
(Ark. 1983). The court found two problems with the local control argument. First, it would be
possible to alter the state financing scheme to equalize funding without reducing local control.
Second, the notion of local control was actually an illusion in low-wealth districts that lacked the
financial ability to exercise any legitimate choice. Id. at 93.
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2. Education Provision Claims
Every state constitution includes some provision relating to education.65 These provisions have served as the basis of plaintiffs' second
type of funding challenge. The state courts have been asked to examine
their public school financing schemes to determine if the schemes satisfy the requirements of these provisions." The question of what level
of educational opportunity the state constitutions require lies at the
heart of these types of challenges61
The school finance challenges that rely on constitutional education
provisions usually consist of two basic arguments. First, plaintiffs claim
that equality in educational opportunity is required, and that any disparities automatically violate their state's education provisions.6 8 Sec65. An explicit duty to educate is included in the constitutions of 48 states. The educational
provisions in the Alabama and Mississippi constitutions have elicited a great amount of controversy about their viability as a basis for finance litigation. Gershon M. Ratner, in one of the most
frequently cited articles on this type of litigation, contends that only 48 states have an "explicit
protection for education" eliminating any discussion about Alabana and Mississippi. Gershon M.
Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX.
L. REv. 777, 814-15 (1985) (those citing Ratner include F. Clinton Broden, Note, Litigating State
ConstitutionalRights to an Adequate Education and the Remedy of State Operated School Districts, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 779 (1990); Note, supra note 14, at 1661; Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J. L. &
EDuc. 93, 96, 97 (1989)). Although another commentator does not discuss the individual provision
of every state constitution, he specifically mentions the Alabama provision and concludes that it
"provides for an explicit but unelaborated commitment" to education. Eric B. Grubb, Breaking
the Language Barrier:The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 52, 67 (1974).
Professor Hubsch states that the wording of the Alabama and Mississippi provisions forecloses any
reliance on them for the enforcement of a right to education. Hubsch, supra, at 97 n.7. But Professor Hubsch does note the existence of a case in each jurisdiction that suggests that the constitutions may nevertheless support litigation of this type. Id. (citing Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist.
v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985) (labeling education as a fundamental right) and Smith v.
Dallas County Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp 1324 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (examining a procedural due process claim based on Alabama's education provision)).
66. See supra notes 20-21.
67. Professor Grubb was the first person to attempt to categorize the varying levels of protection afforded by the education provision. Grubb, supra note 65, at 67-70. Professor Grubb's construct was picked up and refined by Professor Ratner in his article. Ratner, supra note 65, at 81416. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1661-68 (applying Professor Grubb's four-category approach).
The first level of education provisions contains an explicit commitment to education but uses only
general education language. Grubb, supra note 65, at 67. The next group imposes a greater obligation by emphasizing the quality of education provided. Ratner, supra at 65, at 815. The third set
of constitutional provisions is similar to the second but uses differing language and preambles to
strengthen the commitment. Grubb, supra note 65, at 68-69. The fourth group mandates the highest level of educational opportunity by setting out specific duties and using terms such as the
"'paramount duty of the state."' Id. at 69 (quoting WASH. CoNST. art. IX, § 1). For a complete
examination of individual state constitutions' education provisions and how they fit into the fourcategory analysis see Grubb, supra note 65, at 66-70; Ratner, supra note 65, at 814-16; Note, supra
note 14, at 1661-70.
68. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 770-80 (Md. 1983)
(rejecting an interpretation of the Maryland state education provision requiring exact equality in
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ond, plaintiffs argue that the disparities demonstrate that some
districts do not provide the minimum level of educational opportunity
required by the provisions."' The state courts examine their constitutional provisions in light of both of these assertions.
The state courts first determine whether their constitutions' education clauses embody the concept of equal educational opportunity for
all children. Although this issue has involved an assortment of differing
constitutional provisions, the state courts have followed remarkably
similar reasoning when rejecting this assertion. 70 A few courts have
found the absence of any provision specifically setting out a duty to
equalize educational opportunity to be determinative of the question. 7'
Most courts, however, have used the legislative history of the provision
to demonstrate that the framers did not intend to ensure equality of
opportunity. 2 Consequently, these courts have decided that the constitutions do not mandate equal educational opportunity.
Courts have been more receptive to the argument that at some
per-pupil expenditure); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1024-25 (Colo. 1982)
(rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the Colorado education provision requires equal educational
opportunities); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 647 (Idaho 1975) (finding that the Idaho
state education provision does not require "that all services and facilities are equal throughout the
State").
69. See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574-78 (Wis. 1989) (rejecting the plaintiffs'
claim that the Wisconsin education provision requires a reduction in disparities so as to assure the
educational needs of the school districts with the lowest expenditures available); Board of Educ. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 826 (Ohio 1979) (finding that although funding disparities might reach the
point where the poorest schools are "starved for funds," there is no evidence that this has happened yet). The Georgia Supreme Court was faced with both types of education clause challenges.
See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 162-65 (Ga. 1981) (holding that Georgia's education
provision does not require equality of educational opportunity between districts and that there has
been no proof that the low-wealth districts are failing to achieve that minimal level required).
70. Although the courts were faced with provisions which supposedly offered different levels
of protection, see supra note 67, these variations had little if any effect on the outcome in education clause cases. See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
71. For example, in interpreting New York's education provision, the New York Court of
Appeals found that[i]t is significant that this constitutional language-adopted in 1894 at a time when there
were more than 11,000 local school districts in the State, with varying amounts of property
wealth offering disparate educational opportunities-makes no reference to any requirement
that the education to be made available be equal or substantially equivalent in every district.
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139
(1983).
72. The Maryland Supreme Court found that when an original education provision requiring
a "uniform" public school system was replaced by a new amendment with no such clause, it was an
indication that there was no intention to make equality of educational opportunity mandatory.
Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 772. In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on the legislative history
of that state's education provision in rejecting a similar claim. This court found it significant that
the state's first legislators, acting within two years of the passage of the education provision, enacted legislation allowing school districts' total expenditures to depend on local funds. Thompson,
537 P.2d at 648-49.
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point funding may be so inadequate as to fail to provide the minimum
level of education required by the state constitution. 3 The plaintiffs'
principal difficulty in this type of argument is to find sufficient evidence
to prove it. Some courts have found that the plaintiffs failed to offer
enough evidence of a locality's failure to achieve that minimum level of
education.7 4
The state courts that have rejected either the equal protection
claim, the education clause claim, or both have determined that their
state constitutions require no more than a minimal level of educational
opportunity for children. 75 Once the state provides such minimal opportunity, it has fulfilled its constitutional obligation.
B. A Step Toward Equality of Educational Opportunity:
JurisdictionsThat Have Sustained Challenges to Their School
Financing Schemes
1.

Equality Claims

Those states that have sustained challenges to their education financing schemes under an equal protection analysis have employed a
wide variety of methodologies and no clear test has emerged from the
vast number of jurisdictions that have ruled on such challenges. Although at times some courts have referred to the reasoning of other
courtse courts generally have employed independent analyses when
finding a violation of equal protection provisions."
73. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that "in a situation in which a school district was
receiving so little local and state revenue that the students were effectively being deprived of educational opportunity, such a system would clearly not be thorough and efficient." Walter, 390
N.E.2d at 825.
74. See, e.g., Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 578 (finding that plaintiffs failed to assert that the state
was not meeting the minimum standards); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 165 (stating that no evidence
existed to demonstrate that any student was deprived of "basic educational opportunities"). But
see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 585 (finding no claim that insufficient funds exist to
achieve a basic education); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987) (stating that a school system should supply such a degree of education that children may become useful
citizens).
76. The Connecticut Supreme Court appeared to accept the New Jersey Supreme Court's
formula for an equal protection analysis of an education claim. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,
373 (Conn. 1977) (HortonI) (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973)). The Connecticut
court, however, in its most recent statement on the subject adopted a new three-part test for reviewing educational equal protection claims. Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Conn. 1985)
(HortonIII).
77. Compare Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (SerranoI) (using a strict scrutiny
analysis to examine the importance of the right to education in society) with Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) and Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (both relying on the textual commitment of a right to
education in their state constitutions in following a strict scrutiny analysis) with Horton III, 486

1991]

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

The California Supreme Court first set out its test for funda78 which was decided before the United States
mentality in Serrano 1,
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez,79 and later reaffirmed the test after the Rodriguez decision was handed down, in Serrano 11.80 In Serrano I the California
court emphasized the indispensable role of education in a modern industrial society and determined that education is a fundamental right.81
In Serrano 11 the court further defined fundamental rights as those
rights and liberties that are at the core of a democratic government.82
The court used many sources to demonstrate the importance of education, both to government and to society as a whole. A multitude of
statements in federal and state case law affirmed the vital role of education in the modern world. 3 The court also compared the importance of
education with two fundamental interests that were already widely recognized-the rights of defendants in criminal cases and the right to
vote.8 4 Without minimizing the value of an individual's interest in freedom, the court noted that education may be even more important to
society than certain criminal defendant's rights.8 5 The court also stated
A.2d 1099 (using a three-part test) and Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark.
1983) (applying a rational basis standard).
78. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
79. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
80. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
81. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1255.
82. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 929. The Serrano II holding reiterated the court's holding in
SerranoL The California court held that its original decision in SerranoI was still valid notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision. Id. at 950-51.
83. The court first recited one of the most famous declarations of the value of education, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), stating that
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required
in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1256-57 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
The state court opinions cited were no less emphatic about the role of education in modern
life. "'Unequal education, then, leads to unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to participate in the social, cultural, and political activity of our society.'" Id. at
1257 (quoting San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1971)).
84. Id. at 1257-58.
85. "From a larger perspective, education may have a far greater social significance than a
free transcript or a court-appointed lawyer." Id. at 1258. The court quoted a group of noted commentators who concluded that "[E]ducation not only affects a vastly greater number of persons
than the criminal law, but it affects them in ways which- to the state- have an enormous and
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that education at the very least makes voting more meaningful. 6 The
court concluded that the unique and pivotal role of education demands
81
that it be treated as a fundamental constitutional interest.
The post-Rodriguez cases of Pauley v. Kelly8" and Washakie
County School District No. One v. Herschlers9 used a different approach to find that education was a fundamental right. Without specifically acknowledging it, the West Virginia and Wyoming Supreme
Courts relied upon the "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed" test of RodriguezY0 In Pauley the West Virginia court found that a clause in the
state constitution requiring "a thorough and efficient system of free
schools," sufficed to create a fundamental constitutional right."1 Similarly, the Wyoming court in Washakie held that the emphasis on education in the state constitution left no doubt that education is a
fundamental right.9 2 As the two courts made clear, the inclusion of education provisions in their state constitutions was the key consideration
in concluding that education was a fundamental right for equal protection purposes.9 3
The Arkansas Supreme Court also applied a fundamentality test to
determine the appropriateness of an equal protection analysis.9 The
court relied on both the education clause and the role of education in
society to find an equal protection analysis appropriate.9 5 The Arkansas
court then held that the scheme failed to pass even a rational basis
test.9 8
The California and Wyoming Courts also relied on a finding that
much more varied significance." Id. (quoting John E. Coons et al.,
EducationalOpportunity: A
Workable ConstitutionalTest for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 362 (1969)).
These commentators also observed that education reduces the crime rate and "supports each and
every other value of a democratic society." Id. (quoting Coons, supra, at 362).
86. Id. at 1258.
87. Id. The court pointed out that education was necessary for effective participation in the
free enterprise system. Id. at 1258-59. Furthermore, the court found significance in the fact that
education was compulsory for a period of time ranging from 10 to 13 years. Id. at 1259.
88. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
89. 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
90. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
91. 255 S.E.2d at 878 (citation omitted).
92. 606 P.2d at 333.
93. For additional discussion of the tests applied in Pauley and Washakie, see generally
Note, supra note 14, at 1673-74.
This reliance on the explicit or implicit inclusion of a right in a state constitution to determine
whether or not it is a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes is extremely misplaced.
See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
94. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
95. Id. at 93.
96. Id. (finding that the financing scheme "b[ore] no rational relationship to the educational
needs of the individual districts" and holding that the system violated the state equal protection
clause).
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the financing schemes affected the rights of a suspect class." In Serrano
I the California court found that the local funding aspect of the financing scheme made a district's wealth the major factor in educational expenditures.9 8 The court concluded that the wealth of the districts,
rather than that of individuals, was a valid basis for finding a suspect
class.9 9 The Wyoming court, however, stated that a suspect classification based on wealth may not be enough to support an equal protection
claim, but found that it was sufficient when the classification was applied to a fundamental interest. 10 0
No matter what reasoning these courts employ, they all come to
the conclusion that their financing scheme violates the state equal protection clause. These findings constitute a practical mandate from the
courts for the state legislatures to amend their financing scheme or
adopt a new financing scheme that does not create a level of spending
dependent on any wealth other than the wealth of the state as a
whole. 10 1 In effect, the courts provide reluctant legislators with a set of
criteria to follow in designing a new plan.
2.

Education Provision Claims

Those states which have found that a school financing scheme violated their constitution's education clause have adopted an analysis
very similar to those that have rejected similar arguments. 10 2 Using
traditional tools of constitutional interpretation, the courts arrive at
one of two different definitions of the type of educational opportunity
97. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250-55 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1); Washakie, 606
P.2d at 334.
98. 487 P.2d at 1250.
Although the court found that the scheme did partially alleviate the disparities in revenue, it
also found that the system as a whole generated resources in proportion to the wealth of the individual school districts. Id. at 1250-51. The court admitted that the state was correct when it argued that the local tax rate was a factor in determining total revenues. Id. at 1251. In the court's
view, this argument only enhanced the equal protection claim. The court found constitutional significance in the fact that one district can provide the same or greater level of educational quality
for its children with a lesser tax burden than another. Id.
99. Id. at 1252-53. The court found that "[t]o allot more educational dollars to the children
of one district than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence of [commercial
and industrial] property is to make the quality of a child's education dependant upon the location
of [such] establishments." Id.
100. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 334.
101. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 336. Accord Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95
(Ark. 1983) (finding a state scheme unconstitutional and turning the reform problem over to the
legislature); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863 (W. Va. 1979) (remanding for further evidentiary
development to allow the court to review the state's performance of duty better); Serrano v. Priest,
557 P.2d 929, 946-47 n.38 (Cal. 1977) (SerranoI1)(stating that the court's role is to determine the
constitutionality of the scheme and then to "leav[e] the matter of achieving a constitutional system to the body equipped and designed to perform that function").
102. See supra part II.A.2.
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required by their constitutions. The earlier cases found that the constitutional education provisions established a minimum level of educational opportunity that the state had to ensure every school district
reached.10 3 In the more recent cases, however,
courts have defined edu1 04
cational opportunity in terms of equality.
The Supreme Courts of Washington and West Virginia defined
their education clauses in substantive terms. The focus of both courts
was on the individual terms of the constitutional provisions. The West
Virginia Court in Pauley v. Kelly'"° found it necessary to define the
words "thorough," "efficient," and "education" to ascertain the boundaries of the legislature's constitutional mandate. 08 The court concluded
that a thorough and efficient education is one that prepares students
mentally, physically, and morally for their future occupations and for
07
productive citizenship, and that does so in a cost-effective manner.
The court also recognized several specific elements, such as literacy,
math, politics, vocational training, and cultural enrichment, that each
child must learn to the level of his capacity.' In addition, the court
found that sufficient support services were implied in the definition, including physical facilities, instructional material, and personnel.'
The Washington court in Seattle School District No. One v.
State' 0 found that Washington's education provision also delineated
certain guidelines for the legislature to follow."' Although not as specific as the rule set out in Pauley, the Washington court's broad guidelines mandated effective teaching and the opportunity to learn
103. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877-78; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 90-96
(Wash. 1978).
104. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396-97 (Tex. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690-91 (Mont. 1989). The Kentucky Supreme
Court has found that Kentucky's education clause sets substantive criteria in addition to requiring
a degree of equality. See Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-13 (Ky.
1989).
105. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
106. Id. at 874. To arrive at suitable definitions, the court used dictionaries,-both contemporaneous with the passage of the provision and modern--case precedent, and statements by the
framers of the provision. Id.
107. In the court's words, the West Virginia constitution requires a system that "develops, as
best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to
prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically." Id. at 877.
108. Id.
109. Id. These specific elements appear to derive mostly from precedent, although the court
is quite vague about their origin. Id. at 875-77.
The Kentucky Supreme Court laid down an almost identical standard. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at
212.
110. 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
111. Id. at 95.
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minimum essential skills. 1 12 The court defined these essential skills as
those necessary to function in the political system, the labor market, or
in the "market place of ideas.""13 After articulating this standard, both
courts concluded that their state was failing to provide the required
level of education."14 The Washington court went so far as to assert that
the state could only comply with the provision if sufficient funds were
available from a "dependable and regular" tax source." 5
In more recent cases, the Montana and Texas courts found that
their education provisions require a substantial equality of educational
opportunities rather than a substantive level of education that must be
achieved." 6 These courts relied almost exclusively on the plain meaning
of the text, 1 7 the statements of the education provision framers," 8 and
other contemporaneous evidence."' This material provided the courts
with enough information to conclude that, although equal expenditure
per pupil was not required, districts should be120able to raise similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.
The result of a violation under either type of education clause is
the same. Both these courts and those finding an equal protection violation, 12 instructed the legislatures to establish a new system that met
22
the newly determined constitutional criteria.1
C.

The Second Round

Although many jurisdictions have a long history of finance scheme
litigation, only two have resolved what can be considered a second
round of these cases.'2 3 The Connecticut and New Jersey Supreme
112. Id.
113. Id. at 94-95.
114. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Seattle, 585 P.2d at 102.
115. Seattle, 585 P.2d at 98.
116. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.1989).
117. See Helena, 769 P.2d at 689 (stating that by its plain meaning the text guarantees each
person equality of educational experience).
118. See Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 395. The court quotes the chairperson of the education committee at the Constitutional Convention of 1875, stating that "[education] is for the general welfare of all, rich and poor, male and female, that the means of a common school education should, if
possible, be placed within the reach of every child in the State." Id.
119. Id. at 396 (noting that the structure of the school finance system at the time of the
provision's adoption demonstrates that gross disparities were not contemplated).
120. Id. at 397.
121. See supra part H.B.1.
122. See, e.g., Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 399 (stating that "[tihe legislature has the primary re-

sponsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient system"); Seattle, 585 P.2d at 95 (stating
that "the Legislature must hereafter act to comply with its constitutional duty by defining and
giving substantive meaning to [the mandate]").
123. See Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985) (HortonIII) (involving a state court
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Courts both have addressed challenges to plans adopted by their state
legislatures in response to prior court decisions. In fact, in New Jersey
plaintiffs challenged a plan that the court had already ruled was facially
constitutional.' 4 The two courts applied very different standards to
test the constitutionality of the revised funding schemes.
1.

The Connecticut Experience and the Horton Three-Part Test

In its second round case, the Connecticut Supreme Court found the
application of the traditional two-tiered strict scrutiny test to be inappropriate in education financing cases. In Horton v. Meskill (Horton
111)125 the court reiterated its earlier findings to demonstrate the sui
generis nature of finance scheme litigation. 2 ' The Horton III court
noted that because educational deprivation was relative rather than absolute, the Horton I holding required only that the State provide all
students with substantially equal educational opportunities. 2 7 The use
of the traditional equal protection analysis that requires the State to
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the inequalities was thus
improper. 12 8
Instead, the court adopted the analytical framework developed by
federal courts to determine the constitutionality of apportionment
plans. 29 The court found this standard of review was appropriate since
it lacked a narrowly tailored prong. 3 0 The Horton III court's test consisted of three parts. The plaintiff first must prove a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that any inequalities are more than minor
review of a financing scheme adopted in 1979 after the original plan was deemed unconstitutional);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II) (involving a state court review of a financing
scheme adopted in 1975 after the original plan was deemed unconstitutional). The West Virginia
case history might also appear to include a second round case. The decision in State ex rel. Bds. of
Educ. v. Charm, 376 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1988), however, does not directly address a challenge to
the plan adopted in response to a prior decision. Instead, it deals with another aspect of the state
funding scheme and thus is beyond the scope of this Note. In addition, several states have a prolonged history of litigation being transferred back and forth between the state supreme courts and
lower courts. Most of this litigation has dealt with the problem of fashioning a proper remedy. See,
e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 1991 Tex. LEXIS 21 (Edgewood III); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood II); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood I). This remedial litigation sheds little light on the
factors behind the success or failure of the original finance litigation. The cases are not, therefore,
discussed in this Note.
124. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 373.
125. 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985). The Horton III case was an examination of a state financing scheme designed in response to a finding that the state's original scheme was unconstitutional
in Horton I, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
126. Horton III, 486 A.2d at 1105.
127. Id. (quoting Horton I, 376 A.2d at 373).
128. Horton III, 486 A.2d at 1105.
129. Id. at 1106.
130. Id.
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deviations."' 1 After such a demonstration the burden falls on the State
to justify the inequalities by showing that the funding plan reasonably
advances a rational state policy.13 2 Finally, the plan must fail if the dis-

parities are so great as to defeat the underlying state goal.'
The first prong presented the court with little difficulty. Both parties conceded that the evidence demonstrated a substantial disparity
among the individual districts' expenditures."3 4
Since the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the burden of
proof shifted to the State. The court found that the new plan, if successfully implemented, would result in an equitable distribution of educational funds and an acceptable balance between state and local
contributions."3 5 Thus, the plan was likely to fulfill the requirements of
Horton I, meeting the State's burden under the second prong.
Finally, the court found that the State also had fulfilled the requirements of the third prong. Connecticut had reduced disparities in
funding and the State's share in the overall funding had increased
under the new plan.3 6 The court concluded that although disparities
still existed under the new plan, they
did not undermine the achieve3
ments in equalizing state support.

1

2. Abbott II: An Evolution of New Jersey's Education Clause
New Jersey has perhaps the longest history of school finance litigation in the country. 3 8 In the latest of these cases, the New Jersey Supreme

Court in

Abbott v.

Burke (Abbott I1)'.

9

examined

the

constitutionality of a previously approved financing scheme as it applied to individual districts. 40 Unlike the Connecticut Court in Horton
III, which based its analysis on equal protection grounds, 14 1 the New
Jersey court relied on the State's education clause.'42 As other jurisdictions' experiences with their own education provisions have demonstrated,143 the key element of a finance challenge involves the
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1107.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1108.
137. Id.
138. The New Jersey Supreme Court first decided Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.
1973), in April of 1973. The litigation has endured for more than 17 years and will surely continue
at least into the foreseeable future.
139. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
140. Id. at 373.
141. See supra part ll.C.1.
142. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 363.
143. See supra parts II.A.2 and 11.B.2.
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requirements of a particular constitutional clause.
The New Jersey Constitution provides for a "thorough and efficient
system of free public schools."'1 44 The Abbott 11 court's approach to defining this education clause differed from that employed in other jurisdictions. The court relied on state precedent and traced the historical
evolution of the "thorough and efficient" concept. 4 5 The court noted
that as early as 1895, within twenty years of the clause's passage, judicial interpreters found that the concept of equality was included in the
notion of thorough and efficient. 14 6 Since that time, the court has been
trying to determine precisely what that equality means.
The Abbott 11 court first examined the 1973 case of Robinson v.
Cahill (Robinson 1).147 It found that case to require only that the state
provide a certain level of substantive education. 14 The Robinson I
court was unwilling to accept the proposition that every district was
providing education above the substantive level and that all of the disparities in funding were due solely to a49decision by some local districts
to provide a higher level of education.
This focus on monetary disparities did not last very long. The Abbott 1I court noted that the emphasis on funding disparity had already
been reduced by a 1975 decision that ordered a provisional remedy for
the legislature's failure to act within the time limit set by the court. 150
The Robinson IV court, in providing the legislature with guidelines for
a new education plan, noted that Robinson I relied solely on differences
in funding only because of an absence of other viable criteria for measuring compliance. 151 After accepting a variety of other factors that affect educational quality, the Robinson IV court concluded that funding
15 2
was no longer "the overriding answer to the educational problem.'
The Abbott II court viewed the approval of the state's redesigned
scheme in Robinson V' s as the completion of a movement away from
54
funding disparities to substantive education.
144. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
145. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 367-72. The court also noted that any definition of thorough and
efficient must continually change since it depends on "the economic, historical, social, and cultural
context in which that education is delivered." Id. at 367 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-2a(4)
(West 1989)).

146. Id. at 367 (citing Landis v. Ashworth, 31 A. 1017 (N.J. 1895), which found that the
amendment required equality within an intended range).
147. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
148. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 368.
149. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295.
150. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 369.
151. Id. (citing Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 717).
152. Id. (quoting Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 717 n.3).
153. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976).
154. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 369.
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In upholding the new educational plan, the Robinson V court focused on the fact that the State had provided a specific definition of
education and a method for its implementation and supervision. 15 Dollar disparity no longer constituted evidence of a violation of the education provision. The Abbott 11 court concluded that after Robinson V,
per-pupil expenditure was relevant only if it adversely affected the sub156
stantive education provided by a particular district.
Before turning the challenge to the way the plan was applied over
to an administrative agency to build a factual record, the Abbott I court
defined a thorough and efficient education. The court stated that to determine whether or not the new scheme met the mandate of the education provision, the State must weigh the quality of education provided
in property-poor districts with the quality of education in property-rich
districts. 157 The scheme's validity would be judged by the ability of children from the poorer districts "to compete in, and contribute to, the
society entered by the relatively advantaged children." 5 8 The court
proceeded to examine the factual findings of the Administrative Law
Judge in light of this definition.
The court compared the type of education provided by poorer districts under the new plan with that provided by wealthier ones. It first
concluded that great funding disparities existed among districts in the
state that were tied directly to property wealth.'5 9 Next, the court compared course offerings, 160 the number of children receiving education at
a basic skills level,' 8 ' physical facilities,'6 2 and the quality of teachers in
155. Id. at 369-70.
156. Id. at 370.
157. Abbott I, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985).
158. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 372 (quoting Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 390).
159. Id. at 383. See also id. at 382-89.
160. Id. at 395-97. The court found, for example, that Princeton has one computer for every
eight students, while Camden has one for every 58; Princeton has seven built-in science laboratories, while in East Orange, science is taught out of a cart that is wheeled into a tiny area without
water, gas, or electrical lines; Montclair begins foreign language instruction at the preschool level,
while Jersey City begins such instruction in ninth grade. Id. Although evidence of course offerings
was too scarce to allow for firm conclusions about most districts, the findings demonstrated that
the "level of education offered to students in some of the poorer urban districts [was] tragically
inadequate." Id. at 395.
161. Id. at 397. As of 1985, Camden was teaching remedial education to 53% of its children,
East Orange to 41%, and Irvington to 30%. Id. Millburn, by contrast, taught only 4% of its students in such a program.
162. Id. at 396-97. The court found that many poor districts were operating out of schools
that "due to their age and lack of maintenance, are crumbling." Id. at 397. In one district the court
discovered that children ate lunch in the boiler room in the basement, and that remedial education
classes were taught in a converted bathroom. Id. Another district had no cafeteria at all, and students took turns eating in a corridor. In yet another district, a converted cloakroom served as the
library. Id.

152

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:129

different districts.6 3 From this evidence, the court concluded that the
State failed to provide a thorough and efficient system of education, at
64
least in poorer urban districts.
When the court combined this evidence with its finding that the
existing system would never be able to raise every district to a thorough
and efficient level, 16 5 it concluded that the present system was fundamentally inadequate. 166 In light of New Jersey's long history of school
finance reform cases, and the evidence in the case, the court ordered
the State to alter the scheme to provide poorer urban districts with a
6
level of funding equal to that in the richest districts in the State. 7
163. Id. at 366-68. The court compared the teacher-pupil ratios, the average experience level
of the instructional staff, and the average level of education among teachers. The poorer urban
districts suffered in comparison to other districts in each one of these areas. Id. at 399.
The court made several observations about the importance of these different factors. For example, the court noted the wide course offerings of wealthier districts and asked "if these courses
[were] not integral to a thorough and efficient education, why [did] the richer districts invariably
offer them?" Id. at 397. Moreover, "[i]f absolute equality were the constitutional mandate, and
'basic skills' sufficient to achieve that mandate, there would be little short of a revolution in the
suburban districts when parents learned that basic skills is what their children were entitled to,
limited to, and no more." Id. at 397-98.
164. The court engaged in a complex analysis using two Department of Education categories-socioeconomic status and urban districts-to rank each district. The group of schools with
the lowest socioeconomic status rating in the largest cities composes what the court refers to as
"poor urban districts." Id. at 388-44. The court stated that when the characteristics of the poor
urban districts
are combined with the evidence in the record of the substantive failure of thorough and efficient education in these districts, such as their failure to achieve what the DOE considers
passing levels of performance on the High School Proficiency Test (HSPT), the constitutional
failure becomes apparent, the need for a remedy urgent, and the focus of that need clear.
Id. at 387.
165. The concept of municipal overburdening served as a major factor in the determination
that the present system will never be -able to meet constitutional requirements. Id. at 393. Urban
districts are unable to raise taxes for education because of the extremely heavy existing tax load
due to the extraordinarily high cost of other necessary services.
166. The court concluded that
[d]isparity of funding, its relationship to poverty, the critical needs-educational and otherwise-of its pupils, the practical inability to raise further funds through taxation (municipal
overburden), the likelihood of the permanence of these factors, the level of substantive education actually being given, the failure rate of its students, their dropout rate, were all sufficiently shown, and dramatically contrasted with the situation of students in richer districts
to demonstrate that the state is not achieving a thorough and efficient system of public schools. Id.
at 388-89.
167. Id. at 363. Throughout the opinion, the court intimated that equality of funding alone
may be inadequate. The constitutional mandate required "such level of education as will enable all
students to function as citizens and workers in the same society, and that necessarily means that in
poorer urban districts something more must be added to the regular education in order to achieve
the command of the Constitution." Id. at 403. Furthermore, after declaring that the poorer districts must be funded at a level "substantially equal to that of property-rich districts," the court
stated without explanation that "[t]he level of funding must also be adequate to provide for the
special educational needs of these poorer urban districts and address their extreme disadvantages."
Id. at 408. A strong argument could be made that the court's opinion required poorer districts to
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Moreover, such funding could not be dependent on the ability of the
local district to tax. 168 Only such a remedy would satisfy the constitutional mandate.

III. A

LACK OF PREDICTABILITY

The state courts of the many jurisdictions that have been faced
with school finance challenges have addressed these claims in numerous
ways. These courts' opinions suggest that the varying degrees of educational opportunity provided result from the straightforward construction of unique constitutional provisions. When faced with either equal
protection or education clause challenges, courts have articulated various methodologies based on their state constitutions and have ordered
varying levels of protection for students in poorer districts. The state
courts' inconsistent application of these constructs suggests that the individual courts' purported methodologies obscure the real reasons for
the success or failure of school finance challenges.
If the unique characteristics of state constitutions were in fact the
key to the outcome of finance scheme challenges, the educational requirements would correlate closely with the level of protection ostensibly afforded by the education clause at issue. This has not been the
case, however.1 6 9 The vast majority of successful challenges have not
been won in states categorized as having the highest level of protection
for education in their constitutions. Only one state with a strong constibe funded at an even higher level than the wealthier districts.
The court rejected the argument that no amount of funds could eliminate the disadvantages of
students from poorer districts with one of the most eloquent statements on the need for state
intervention in education since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954):
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable the poorer urban districts to satisfy
the thorough and efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are entitled to pass or
fail with at least the same amount of money as their competitors.
If the claim is that these students simply cannot make it, the constitutional answer is,
give them a chance. The Constitution does not tell them that since more money will not help,
we will give them less; that because their needs cannot be fully met, they will not be met at
all. It does not tell them they will get the minimum, because that is all they can benefit from.
Like other states, we undoubtedly have some "uneducable" students, but in New Jersey there
is no such thing as an uneducable district, not under our Constitution.
All of the money that supports education is public money, local money no less than state
money. It is authorized and controlled, in terms of source, amount, distribution, and use, by
the State. The students of Newark and Trenton are no less citizens than their friends in
Millburn and Princeton. They are entitled to be treated equally, to begin at the same starting
line. Today the disadvantaged are doubly mistreated: first, by the accident of their environment and, second, by the disadvantage added by an inadequate education. The State has
compounded the wrong and must right it.
Id. at 403.
168. Id. See supra note 165.
169. See supra sources cited in note 67. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1661-70 (discussing
the successes and failures of state challenges under the various education clauses).
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tutional commitment to education has sustained a school finance challenge.117 Rather, those states with the seemingly lowest levels of
protection have more often ordered reform. 1 ' This lack of any discernible relationship between the strength of commitment to education in
the state constitution and the success rate of school finance challenges
makes it clear that the outcome of these cases does not depend on the
interpretation of the constitution involved.
A second characteristic of school finance litigation is the inconsistent application of the equal protection analysis. Many jurisdictions
that have rejected an equal protection claim did so because they found
that education was not a fundamental right.1 2 The key to these holdings was a determination that the "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed"
test of Rodriguez was inappropriate in the state constitutional context. 73 Although this argument seems persuasive, several states have
adopted the Rodriguez approach and applied a strict scrutiny test using
the fact that an education provision was included in their constitution
as the basis for a finding of fundamentality.1 4 Two jurisdictions that
have found education to be a fundamental right, however, rejected the
1 5
application of strict scrutiny and instead used the rational basis test.'
The state courts' erratic application of the various methodologies
suggests that they are being less than candid when they point to the
individual characteristics of their state constitutions to justify their decisions. The traditional analytical technique of examining the varying
constitutional constructs used by individual state courts sheds little
light on what truly motivates the results in these cases.
IV.

WHY HAVE THE COURTS DECIDED THE WAY THEY HAVE?

If the outcome of finance litigation is not explained by the unique
construction of the states' constitutions, what causes the success or failure of this type of litigation? All state courts have intimated that the
area of school financing is best left to the legislature. Only when courts
conclude that their legislature is unwilling or unable to pass effective
170. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (sustaining an education provision challenge under the Washington clause that declares education to be a "paramount"
state duty).
171. See Ratner, supra note 65, at 815-16; Note, supra note 14, at 1661-70 & accompanying
footnotes (classifying Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Texas, and West
Virginia as having education clauses that fall in the two lowest tiers of protection).
172. See supra part H.A.I.b.
173. This is due to the fact that state constitutions, unlike the Federal Constitution, are not
documents of delegated power and specified authority. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
174. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
175. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 580 (Wis. 1989); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d
590, 592-93 (Ariz. 1973).

1991]

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

remedial legislation will they intervene.
Other factors contribute to, and in some cases may even be determinative of, the success or failure of school finance challenges. The
method by which judges are selected could affect a court's willingness to
intervene in the school reform arena. Appointed judges may be more
likely to find in favor of a plaintiff because of their insulation from direct political accountability.17 6 In addition, the political orientation of
the court is another potential predictive factor. A court that may fairly
be described as "liberal" as opposed to "conservative" in terms of its
substantive doctrine and activism likely would be more inclined to interfere with this traditionally legislative prerogative. 1 7 Another predictor of the outcome of this type of legislation is the particular social
values of a state's people-state courts may interpret their constitutions in light of the social values of their population. 78 As a result, a
court in a state with a very strong tradition of school reform might be
more likely to interpret its state constitution in the light most favorable
to such reform.
While these and other factors undoubtedly contribute to the success of school finance challenges, frustration with continual legislative
inaction is implicit in virtually every case.17 9 Only when a court is convinced that the legislature is unwilling or unable to effectuate financing
reform will the court take on the responsibility.
All state courts accept the basic premise of judicial deference in the
school financing area. This belief is readily apparent in virtually every
176. See Note, Unfulfilled Promises:School FinanceRemedies and State Courts, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 1072, 1090 (1991). This writer suggests that the appointment of the New Jersey Supreme
Court by the governor makes the court less likely to succumb to majoritarian opposition to the
costs of reform. Id. An examination of the states with appointed justices compared to those that
have elected judges demonstrates little direct statistical correlation with the success of this type of
challenge. Of the 10 jurisdictions upholding finance scheme challenges (including Michigan, whose
decision was vacated as improvidently granted, see Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711, and Connecticut, which first upheld and later rejected this type of challenge), only New Jersey and Connecticut appoint their justices. Of the 15 jurisdictions rejecting finance scheme challenges (also
including Connecticut), only Arizona, Connecticut, and New York appoint their justices. This lack
of a nationwide correlation does not mean that in an individual case the independence of the
judiciary could not be a very significant factor in the outcome.
177. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, which has been very active in finance
reform litigation and has continually found for the plaintiffs in these types of cases, see supra part
H.C.2, has been compared to the Warren Court due to its desire to effectuate social change. See
Rorie Sherman, In N.J., Who's Really the Boss? Jury Still Out, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 1.
178. Adam S. Cohen, More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and ConstitutionalActions for the Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615, 643 (discussing Alaska's tradition of privacy that
has protected possession of marijuana in the home).
179. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189, 198, 213 (Ky.
1989); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 377 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d
391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
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decision that rejected a finance challenge.18 0 These courts were concerned with their lack of expertise in the area' 8 ' and were reluctant to
i 2
intrude upon the legislature in the realm of social policy.
Language of judicial deference to the state legislature also exists in
the decisions of those courts that upheld the challenges. These decisions invariably include a seemingly obligatory statement by the court
that it is the legislature's responsibility to provide adequate education. 8 3 These state courts recognize their duty to give due deference to
their legislatures' attempts to achieve a level of education which meets
their constitutional mandate.8
The state courts' deference to legislatures has manifested itself not
only in the language of judicial opinions, but also in the remedial process. When the courts have found a violation of the state constitution,
they have turned the task of formulating a proper remedy over to the
legislature without so much as maintaining jurisdiction to oversee the
process. 8 5 All state court opinions on this topic suggest that solving the
problems of school financing is the province of state legislatures.
For the state courts to intervene in this presumptively legislative
180. See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 582 (1989) (stating that the court owes
deference to the legislature when a fiscal dispute involves educational policy); Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 1982) (stating that it is inappropriate for a court to intrude on
legislative decisions involving educational expenditures), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983);
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982) (stating that school expenditure questions are properly decided by the legislature).
181. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018.
183. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978) (stating that
it is the "[l]egislature's obligation ...
to provide 'basic education' through a basic program").
184. See, e.g., Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 393 (N.J. 1990) (stating that plaintiffs must meet a
high burden of proof before the court will overturn such legislation); Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No.
One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 319 (Wyo. 1980) (noting that "the supreme court has the duty to
give great deference to legislative pronouncements and to uphold constitutionality whenever
possible").
185. E.g., Seattle, 585 P.2d at 77, 95-97; Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d
391, 399 (Tex. 1989).
The Wyoming Supreme Court's Washakie decision provides perhaps the most eloquent example of this judicial deference. After finding the state system unconstitutional, the court stated:
The legislature has made valiant and sincere efforts to arrange the financing of an adequate
school program, using a combination of local and state funds. It has only been since 1971 that
a successful attack has won in the courts so that an enlightened course of reasoning is available to guide reform from an inequitable disparity in spendable funds for education which has
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax ....
It will not be an easy task. It
will require time for adequate study, drafting of appropriate legislation and transition from
the present scheme of financing to one in conformity with the sense of this decision; so this
court will provide a period of time in which to convert to constitutional compliance.
606 l.2d at 337. See also supra notes 101, 122 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Washakie, 606
P.2d at 337 (retaining jurisdiction until a "constitutional body of legislation is enacted and in
effect").
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area required a recognition that the legislators had been unwilling or
unable to implement their constitutional mandate. This frustration
with the legislature may be the real key to successful finance reform
challenges. Impatience with legislative inaction is reflected in several
ways.
The clearest evidence of judicial frustration is the language of the
various state court opinions. The Kentucky Supreme Court's statement
in Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc. is typical: "In spite of the past
and present efforts of the General Assembly, Kentucky's present system
of common schools falls short of the mark of the constitutional mandate
of 'efficient.' "18 The Washington Supreme Court was equally candid
when it stated, after an examination of the practices of that state's earliest legislatures, that, "[iln the final analysis . . . it is not the failure of
our early legislatures that troubles us. Rather, our current concern is
the failure of subsequent legislatures to make ample provision for...
education ... . 7
In addition to the language of state court decisions, an individual
state's history of reform can be equally revealing. The State of Tennessee has been trying to institute an educational finance reform program
since the 1970s, when the state education commission issued several reports declaring the existing financing scheme to be unfair and unreasonable."" 8 The failure of the Tennessee legislature to implement reform
186. 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989). In its opinion, the Kentucky court repeatedly mentioned the inability of the General Assembly to live up to its constitutional duty. Id. at 189, 198.
187. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 93 (Wash. 1978). Accord Abbott II, 575
A.2d 359, 376 (N.J. 1990) (stating that "for ten years and more there has been no thorough and
efficient education in these districts. . . . Judicial deference can go just so far"); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (stating that Texas's legislative efforts have
not been enough and that "[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be changed");
Washakie, 606 P.2d at 320 (stating, after a discussion of past legislative acts and other court decisions, that "[t]he question of inequality in school financing has been smoldering too long," and
that "[t]he continuing dispute must be settled"); SerranoII, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal. 1977) (holding
that the improvements made by the California legislature were not sufficient to overcome the inequality caused by the system).
As these cases and others suggest, the courts' observations about legislative inaction are usually sympathetic. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189 (stating that the court "intend[s] no criticism
of the substantial efforts made by the present General Assembly"). Another court noted that
"[t]he record is replete with evidence of [the state legislators'] dedication, industriousness, perseverance and, ultimately, their considerable accomplishments. The problems they face have bedeviled the entire nation. No one has solved them. Our constitutional conclusion in no way belittles
their prodigious efforts and their many achievements." Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
This apparent understanding in no way undermines the conclusion that frustration with legislative
inaction is a factor that is crucial to the success of challenges to school financing schemes. It
merely demonstrates that legislative inaction does not always result from the legislature's unwillingness to pursue its constitutional mandate. Often the legislature simply is incapable of doing so.
188. See Duren Cheek, Rural Schools Decided Suit Only Hope for Equality, THE TENNESSEAN, July 26, 1991, at 4A. See also Duren Cheek, Rural Schools Press Court for Quick Fix, THE
TENNESSEAN,
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programs both before and after the filing of a lawsuit by small county
school systems substantiated the reformers' conclusion that a lawsuit
represented the only hope for change. 8 "
The legislature's unwillingness to take any action became evident
during the trial. The plaintiffs' attorney offered to drop the lawsuit if
the State agreed to implement the State Board of Education's proposed
reform, which the State had relied on as an indication that a judicial
remedy was unnecessary. The State refused. 19 0 The legislature's opposition to any financing reform became even more evident when it passed
a resolution urging the Tennessee Attorney General to appeal the decision if the State lost at the Chancery Court level.' 9' Although the chan92
cellor's decision was couched strictly in equal protection language,1
there can be little doubt that the repeated failure of the State legislature to pass any reform legislation directly affected the outcome of the
suit.
The procedural history of the New Jersey finance litigation demonstrates the New Jersey courts' continued attempts to prompt legislative
action. Time after time either legislative inaction or insufficient action
prompted judicial response. In 1973 the New Jersey Supreme Court
outlined the level of education guaranteed by that state's constitution
and held that the State's financing scheme was insufficient to meet that
constitutional mandate.'
Adopting a deferential position, the court
turned the formulation of a remedial financing scheme over to the legislature.'9 In 1975, however, after two years of virtual inactivity by the
legislature, the court finally was forced to act. 9" The court stated that
189. See Duren Cheek, Rural Schools Decided Suit Only Hope for Equality, THE TENNESJuly 26, 1991, at 4A. (reporting that a small county school attempted to get a $100,000 increase in expenditure from the state legislature in 1986 after a cut in federal funding); Chancellor
Awaits Hearing on School Funding Remedies, THE NASHVmLE BANNER, Sept. 9, 1991, at B4 (reporting that Governor McWherter's 1988 reform bill failed to receive legislative approval); Duren
Cheek, Rural Schools' Lawsuit Returns to Court Today, THE TENNESSEAN, Sept. 12, 1991, at 4B
(reporting that Governor McWherter's plan failed to receive legislative approval in 1991); Duren
Cheek, Rural Schools Now Feel Justified in Suing State, THE TENNESSEAN, July 21, 1991, at 1A
(quoting the superintendent of one of the plaintiff school systems stating that "[tihe legislature's
inability to pass school and tax reform bills proves that suing the state was the proper action for
poor, rural school systems to pursue"); No More Excuses! Fund State's Schools, THE TENNESSEAN,
Aug. 8, 1991, at 12A (commenting in an editorial that the legislature probably would not call a
special session to deal with the financing issue and stating that "[i]f [the legislators] had it their
way, they'd dodge and duck Tennessee's obvious problem forever").
190. Duren Cheek, Curve Ball: From Left Field, Small Schools' Lawyer Says He'll Drop
Case if Reforms Adopted, THE TENNESSEAN, Nov. 22, 1990, at 1A.
191. Duren Cheek, Small Systems Win Case, THE TENNESSEAN, July 26, 1991, at 1A.
192. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, No. 88-1812-11 (Tenn. Chancery Ct. July 25,
1991) (nonfinal decision awaiting completion of remedy phase of bifurcated trial).
193. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (N.J. 1973).
194. Id.
195. See Robinson IV, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
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it had given the legislature ample opportunity to remedy the constitutional defects in the New Jersey school finance scheme and now had no
alternative but to impose a judicial remedy. 196 After this expression of
utter dissatisfaction with the progress of the State legislature in remedying the constitutional defect, the court provided for a contingent
197
remedy that greatly increased the aid to poorer districts.
In response to the court's 1975 decision the legislature finally
passed a new financing scheme.19 8 Although this legislation addressed
many of the problems identified by the court, it still failed to remedy
the primary defect of funding disparity. 199 As a result, in 1976 a facial
challenge to the legislation came before the court.2 00 Out of deference to
the legislature the court found the new scheme facially valid.2 0 It took
almost ten more years before a challenge to the application of the new
legislation reached the New Jersey Supreme Court.0 2 After years of
factfinding by an administrative agency the court held the New Jersey
financing scheme unconstitutional, concluding that the lack of thorough
and efficient education in the poorest districts had persisted for too
long and that judicial deference was no longer appropriate. 3 Once
again, the inability of the legislature to respond to constitutional requirements forced the court to intervene.
V.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the various state court opinions involving financing schemes demonstrates that the outcome of this litigation has
less to do with the methodological approach of the court or the individual characteristics of the state's constitution than with a variety of
other factors involving the relationship between the court and the legislature. Foremost among these factors is the determination by the court
that the legislature has abdicated its constitutional duty to provide
196. In the court's own words,
Having previously identified a profound violation of constitutional right, based upon the default in a legislative obligation imposed by the organic law in the plainest of terms, we have
more than once stayed our hand, with appropriate respect for the province of other Branches
of government. In final alternative,we must now proceed to enforce the constitutionalright
involved.
Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 722.
198. Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (N.J. 1990).
199. Id.
200. Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976).
201. Abbott II, 575 A.2d 370-71 (stating that the constitutionality of the act must turn on its
application and pointing to Chief Justice Hughes's concurrence emphasizing the importance of
allowing the legislature to design a remedy).
202. See Abbott I, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
203. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 376.
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educational opportunity to all of the state's children. If the legislature
and the electorate fulfilled their responsibility more effectively through
the enactment of legislation that effectuates equal educational opportunity for all children, then judicial intervention would not be justified or
needed. Until that happens, however, the realization of states' promises
of education for all their children will fall to the state courts.
Jonathan Banks

